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Abstract: With the emergence of XML as the de facto standard to exchange and disseminate 
information, the problem of regulating access to XML documents has attracted a considerable 
attention in recent years. Existing models attach authorizations to nodes of an XML document 
but disregard relationships between them. However, ancestor and sibling relationships may 
reveal information as sensitive as the one carried out by the nodes themselves (e.g., 
classifications, correlations). This paper advocates the integration of relationships as first class 
citizen in the access control models for XML and makes the following contributions. First, it 
characterizes three essential classes of relationship authorizations and identifies the mechanisms 
required to translate them accurately in an authorized view of a source document. Second, it 
introduces a rule-based formulation for expressing these classes of relationship authorizations 
and defines an associated conflict resolution strategy. Third, it proposes tractable algorithms to 
support relationship authorizations. Rather than being yet-another XML access control model, 
the proposed approach allows a seamless integration of relationship authorizations in existing 
XML access control model. 
 
Keywords: Data confidentiality, XML access control, XML relationship, need-to-know and 
consent principles. 
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Résumé: En raison de l'émergence de XML, standard de facto d'échanges de données sur Inter-
net, les problèmes liés à la régulation des accès aux documents XML a reçu une attention consi-
dérable ces dernières années. Les modèles de contrôle d'accès existants attachent des autorisa-
tions sur les nœuds du document XML, mais se désintéressent des liens entre les nœuds. Cepen-
dant, les arcs reliant les nœuds, tels que les liens de descendance ou de fraternité, peuvent 
révéler des informations aussi sensibles que les nœuds eux-même (i.e. une classification, une 
corrélation). Ce rapport défend l'intégration des associations entre les nœuds comme des élé-
ments de première classe dans les modèles de contrôle d'accès et définit les contributions sui-
vantes. Dans un premier temps, trois classes essentielles d'association sont caractérisées et pour 
chacune d'entre elles les mécanismes nécessaires pour calculer de façon appropriée la vue auto-
risée d'un document source sont illustrés. Dans un second temps, le formalisme des règles per-
mettant d'exprimer ces trois classes d'associations est présenté, ainsi que la politique de résolu-
tion de conflits associée. Dans un troisième temps, les algorithmes permettant le support des 
règles d'autorisation sur les associations sont décrits. Plutôt que de proposer un tout nouveau 
modèle, l'approche proposée vise à étendre les modèles de contrôle d'accès existants pour XML 
avec de nouvelles règles sur les associations. 
Mots clés: Confidentialité des données, contrôle d'accès XML, le besoin d'en savoir et de 
consentement. 
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1 Introduction 
XML has become the de facto standard to describe, exchange and disseminate any kind of 
information among various partners and for various purposes. Meanwhile, safeguarding data 
confidentiality, privacy and intellectual property has become a primary concern for citizens, 
administrations and companies. This motivated several recent works on XML access control, 
tackling different facets of the problem. Discretionary [3,9,15,20], Role-Based [18,26,35] and 
Mandatory [8] access control models have been proposed in the context of XML. A particular 
attention has been paid on the granularity of the access control (from DTD to attribute instances) 
[3,9,15], on the performance of the algorithms implementing this control [8,23,36], on the 
distribution channel used to expose the information (pull, push, selective dissemination) 
[4,5,24,37] and on the tamper-resistance of the access control [6,22,31]. 
 
All these works have the commonality to focus the access control on the nodes of an XML 
document (elements and attributes). Ancestor and sibling relationships among nodes are never 
considered as legitimate targets of the access control. Roughly speaking, an access control 
policy is composed of a set of positive (resp. negative) authorization rules granting (resp. 
denying) a given subject access to some nodes of the document. These nodes are usually 
selected thanks to XPath expressions. The descendant relationship among nodes is simply 
exploited as a mean to propagate authorization rules down through the XML hierarchy. There 
are substantial differences among the models in the way conflicts among – potentially 
propagated – positive and negative rules are tackled. In [3,15], the complete subtree rooted at a 
forbidden node is forbidden. This constraint is relaxed in [9], allowing exceptions to a negative 
rule to be expressed. However, this leads to make visible the label (i.e., tag) of forbidden 
ancestor(s) in the path from the root to an authorized node. Replacing the node label by a 
dummy value has been proposed in [12] to reduce information disclosure in such situation. This 
brings to light the difficulty to define accurately the view that should be delivered of the path 
leading to an authorized node. 
 
More precisely, disregarding XML relationships in the expression of the access control leads to 
two important problems. 
 
− Classification disclosure: the structure of an XML document often reveals a classification4 
(e.g., subtrees organized according to the medical services where patients are treated, 
activities or sales areas of companies, socio-economic categories of citizens or profiles of 
customers). Therefore, the membership of an authorized node to a given subtree conveys its 
classification. Whatever be the information hidden in the root node of that class to protect 
this sensitive information, it can be often inferred by simple statistical attacks (the cardinality 
of a class frequently reveals that class). In addition, disclosing the class membership for a 
single element discloses the membership for all, making any obfuscation mechanism 
preserving the class decomposition non-robust. 
− Uniform descendant exposure: the authorization rules expressed on ancestor nodes 
determines a common authorized view of the path leading to all their descendants. In other 
words, there is no way to deliver two different authorized views of the same ancestor for two 
of its descendants (e.g. one patient is willing to hide the medical service she is treated in 
while another consents to disclose this information).  
These two problems hurt the basic need-to-know and consent principles enacted in most 
government security policies and laws related to the safeguard of personal information, like the 
                                                           
4 Classification is used in this paper in its usual meaning (i.e., synonym of categorization). 
4  SMIS 
INRIA 
Federal Privacy Act in the US [27] and the Data Protection Directive in the EU [11]. The need-
to-know principle limits access to information to those people who need strictly this information 
to carry out their duties. Clearly, classification disclosure hurts this principle each time the 
information contained in a given subtree (e.g., a personal folder) is self-content wrt a given 
purpose. The consent principle prohibits the disclosure of personal information without the 
explicit consent of the donor in a number of situations defined by the law. In our context, this 
means that the donor must be given some prerogative to control how her information (e.g., her 
medical folder) is exposed and made accessible in an XML document. This requirement 
contradicts a uniform descendant exposure.  Beyond the safeguard of personal information, this 
requirement exists each time data extracted from independent sources are aggregated inside a 
same document (e.g., suppliers being asked to externalize information on their product or 
manufacturing process by a governmental agency). 
 
More than ever, there is a strong need to define access control models that help translating more 
accurately law principles into practice. To make a step forward in this direction, this paper 
advocates the integration of ancestor and sibling relationships as first class citizen in the access 
control models for XML. As mentioned above, relationships between nodes may reveal 
information as sensitive as the one carried out by the nodes themselves and hence, deserve to be 
protected as such. The objective is to provide means to control accurately the view that must be 
delivered of the path leading to any authorized node (i.e., subtree) in an XML document. More 
precisely, this paper makes the following contributions: 
 
1. Characterization of relationship authorizations 
 
The first problem is to characterize which relationships need to be protected and to define 
the means by which they can be protected. To this end, we distinguish three classes of 
relationship authorizations (ancestor depersonalization, path reduction and selective 
sibling decorrelation) and exhibit two mechanisms (cloning and shuffling) required to 
translate them accurately into the authorized view of a source document.  
 
2.  Relationship-aware access control model 
 
The second problem is to define a simple but comprehensive access control model 
encompassing nodes and relationships authorizations. We propose a rule-based formulation 
for expressing the three classes of relationship authorizations mentioned above and we 
define a conflict resolution strategy to manage the conflicts that may occur among them. 
Rather than being yet-another XML access control model, our approach allows a seamless 
integration of relationship authorizations in existing XML access control models. 
 
3. Relationship-aware access control algorithms 
 
The last problem is to assess whether algorithms implementing a relationship-aware access 
control model can meet reasonable complexity and performance. We introduce the basic 
principles of these algorithms and discuss performance issues based on preliminary 
performance measurements. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a case study motivating the integration 
of XML relationships in the expression of access control policies. Section 3 characterizes three 
important classes of relationship authorizations. Section 4 introduces a rule-based formulation 
for expressing relationship authorizations and discusses the upward compatibility of our 
approach with existing XML access control models, making them relationship-aware. Section 5 
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focuses on implementation and performance issues. Section 6 presents related works. Finally, 
section 7 concludes and sketches important open issues. 
 
2 Motivating Exemple 
We built our motivating example from requirements expressed by a real life medical application 
related to the treatment of AIDS disease. Figure 1 depicts the way the medical information of 
interest is structured. Organizing a safe sharing of medical folders among several parties 
(patients, physicians, pharmacists, medical labs, Medicare and insurance companies) having 
different duties and objectives is an important social and technological challenge. Government’s 
enact specific laws to regulate access to medical records [1], like the well recognized Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the US [34]. However, the fail in 
translating law statements into convincing technology means strongly curbs the deployment of 
shared medical folders management systems, though highly required for financial saving and 
quality of care reasons. An analysis of the benefits and shortcomings of HIPAA illustrates this 
situation quite well [28]. 
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Figure 1. Medical Folders 
Below are three examples of simple but important authorization rules that cannot be managed 
accurately with existing XML access control models. 
 
• R1: Hide to the hospital’s directory application the name of the service where patients are treated, for 
those who didn’t consent making this information public. 
As stated in HIPAA, the hospital directory is a rather sensitive information considering the 
inquiries made about patients by relatives, employers, media, police and members of religious 
groups. The effect of this authorization rule on the document pictured in Figure 1 should be to 
attach the Folder element of each patient of interest to a depersonalized Service element (i.e., 
element with an anonymous label) while keeping the ancestor chain of the other folders 
unaffected. As pictured in Figure 2.a, this restructuration must be done in a way that prevents 
classification disclosure. 
 
XML access control models like [3,15] give the ability to hide a folder in the document. This 
does not match the objective since the presence of the patient in the hospital turns to be hidden 
as well, which is not the purpose of Rule R1. The model proposed in [9] allows defining a 
negative rule on Service and a positive one on Folder. Unfortunately, the label of Service (the 
information to be protected in our context) will be disclosed. This problem is tackled in [12], 
replacing this label by a dummy value. However, whatever be the model, classification 
6  SMIS 
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disclosure is not precluded and above all, the authorization rule applies uniformly to all folders, 
neglecting the patient’s consent.  
 
• R2: Hide to pharmacists the fact that some drug prescriptions participate in a protocol (i.e., a medical 
trial). 
The pharmacist must be aware of all prescriptions to check drug incompatibilities but giving 
him the knowledge that some drugs participate in a protocol discloses important information on 
the patient’s disease and its stage. The expected effect of this authorization rule is to drop 
Protocol elements and attach Act elements as direct children of their MedActs ancestor, giving 
them a position similar to regular Act elements. Depersonalizing Protocol is useless in this case 
since that information would be obvious to infer (regular and protocol prescriptions form two 
classes with their ancestor as a distinguishing factor). 
 
Again, existing access control models give the ability either to hide the complete subtree rooted 
at a Protocol element [3,15] or to depersonalize Protocol elements. Both solutions hurt the need-
to-know principle by disclosing too little or too much information.  
 
• R3: Hide to a medical lab the correlation between the medical acts and analysis information on one side and 
the identification information on the other side. 
HIPAA stipulates that the patient consent is required for any disclosure related to marketing, 
despite the fine line that may exists between need-to-know and marketing issues. In the 
following we assume that the first group of elements (MedActs, Analysis) is required wrt the 
need-to-know principle while the second (name, address) is collected under the patient consent 
for marketing purpose (e.g., related to new medications). The expected effect of this 
authorization rule is to make both groups of information available while precluding the 
inference of their initial sibling relationship. 
 
Using existing access control models would impose to define two separate access control 
policies for the same document and the same user (i.e., the medical lab) while precluding their 
conjunction and preventing as well the risk of inference mentioned above
5
, an open issue.  
 
These three situations demonstrate the limits of existing access control models and advocate the 
integration of explicit authorizations on ancestor and sibling relationships in the expression of 
access control policies. On the other hand, authorizations on nodes are well suited to define the 
fraction of each folder that must be disclosed in each situation. The three expected authorized 
views of the initial document, derived by a combination of nodes and relationships 
authorizations, are pictured in Figure 2. 
 
Finally, one may wonder about the number of authorization rules that should be defined to 
capture the personal consent of each person. While consent is a personal matter, it is worth-
noting that its dimensions (as enacted by the law) are quite reduced. Therefore, consent can be 
integrated in each folder by dedicated XML elements, allowing capturing the common consent 
of several people in a single set-oriented authorization rule. This point will be illustrated in 
Section 4. 
3 Characterization of Relationship Authorizations 
Existing XML access control models interpret an access control policy as a mapping between a 
source document (or Source for short) and an authorized view of this same document (or View) 
and rely on the assumption that View ⊆ Source. More precisely, authorization rules select the 
                                                           
5 Note that a simple inference attack could be conducted by comparing the element ordering in both views. 
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subset of Source nodes that will participate in View. As a side effect, edges having one of their 
extremity node discarded by an authorization rule are in turn discarded from View. As our 
motivating example makes clear, considering relationship authorizations compels us to revisit 
this assumption since View may result from a more complex restructuration of Source. 
Typically, new paths and nodes may appear in View and the node ordering may be different 
from the Source one to prevent inference. In this section, we concentrate on the semantics of 
relationship authorizations and define for each of them its impact on the resulting View. We do 
not make any assumption on how View is actually defined (XQuery statement vs. system of 
rules) nor built (materialization vs. streaming), these two issues being discussed respectively in 
Section 4 and Section 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Authorized views 
3.1 Notations 
Let us now introduce the model of XML document we consider and the associated notations that 
will be used along the paper. An XML document d is defined by a tuple (Labeld, Valued, Nd, rd, 
Ed, φlabel, λvalue, ϕorder), where: 
 
- Labeld is a set of element labels (also called tags) and attribute names of type string  
- Valued is a set of attribute/element values of type string  
- Nd = N
e
d∪Nad is a set of nodes representing elements and attributes, respectively. Each n∈Ned has a 
required element label∈Labeld and an optional element value∈Valued, whereas each n∈Nad has a 
required attribute label∈Labeld and a required attribute value∈Valued. 
- rd: is a particular node representing the document root. 
- Ed: Ed ⊂ (Nd∪rd) × Nd  is a set of edges, where each e∈Ed represents an element-subelement or element-
attribute relationship.   
- φlabel: Nd → Labeld  is the node labeling function.  
- λvalue: Nd → Valued  is the node valuation function. 
- ϕorder: Nd → Integer is the node ordering function, reflecting a preorder traversal of the tree. 
In addition, Anc(n), Desc(n) and Sibling(n) denote respectively the set of ancestors, descendants 
and siblings of a given node n∈Nd and Parent(n) denotes its parent node. Path(n1,n2) denotes a 
path from node n1 to node n2. According to this model, an XML document is modeled as a 
labeled graph where nodes represent elements and attributes, and edges relationships between 
them. If a node does not have any parent, it is implicitly linked with the document root. 
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3.2 Cloning and Shuffling mechanisms 
Taking into account user’s consent in access control models imposes to generate in View 
different replicas of the same Source nodes and paths. Basically, replicating a Source node n1 is 
required each time two of its authorized descendants n2 and n3 must be reachable in View by a 
path delivering two conflicting visions of n1 to conform to the semantics of a given 
authorization rule. Rule R1 of our motivating example illustrates this point. Since an XML 
document is a tree, every node participating in the common subpath 
Path(n1,Parent(n2))∩Path(n1,Parent (n3)) has in turn to be replicated. Cloning is the principle 
by which Source elements and paths are replicated in View. Note that leaf nodes of a source 
document (terminal elements and attributes) are never subject to cloning. In the following, we 
use the term original and clone(s) to distinguish in View between the genuine image of a Source 
element or path and the element(s) or path(s) resulting from a cloning operation. 
  
Element Cloning 
We denote by ñi ∈ NeView the ith clone of node n ∈ NeSource. Subscripts are used when the 
different clones of a same node have to be distinguished and are omitted otherwise. The label, 
value and order of a clone are defined as follows: 
φlabel(ñ) ∈ {φlabel(n) ,“anonymous”}
6
 
λvalue(ñ) = ∆, where ∆ denotes the empty string 
ϕorder(ñ) = Shuffle(Sibling(ñ)),  
where Shuffle defines a random order among the clones being sibling of a same node. The 
necessity of shuffling is explained afterward. 
 
Path Cloning 
Let u be a path (n1,n2…nk) / n1,n2…nk ∈ NeSource and (n1,n2) … (nk-1,nk) ∈ ESource, ũ denotes the clone 
of u and is defined by (ñ1,ñ2…ñk) / ñ1,ñ2…ñk ∈ NeView and (ñ1,ñ2)…(ñk-1,ñk) ∈ EView. 
The ordering of clones in View  has to be carefully managed to avoid basic inferences. To 
illustrate this, let us consider Rule R3 of our motivating example and assume that the View  
ordering is such that the instances of the two groups of elements to be decorrelated, namely 
(MedActs, Analysis) and (name, address) of each folder, keep respectively the same relative 
order as in Source . In this case, the sibling relationship among the two groups of elements, 
that should be obfuscated thanks to the cloning mechanism, is patently disclosed by the element 
ordering (i.e., the i
th 
instance of (MedActs, Analysis) corresponds to the i
th 
instance of (name, 
address). A similar problem exists with Rule R1 if the clones of a Service element that should be 
hidden are placed in close proximity to their original (e.g., direct right or left sibling). Thus, 
cloning does not make sense without node shuffling (see Figure 2.a and 2.c). 
 
Node shuffling 
Node shuffling is a recursive process that applies at each node of View  containing clone 
children. All clones, children of a given node, are shuffled together to prevent ordering-based 
inference. For a given node, the cloned children are grouped after its original children (by 
convention), and then shuffled. The relative order of the original Source  nodes must however 
be preserved in View  since node ordering is significant in XML. The ordering function ϕorder 
must therefore satisfy the two following properties: 
 
- ∀ni,nj∈NSource, ∀ni’,nj’∈NView / ni=ni’ and nj=nj’, ϕorder(ni) < ϕorder(nj) ⇒ ϕorder(ni’) < ϕorder(nj’) 
- ∀ñ∈NView, ϕorder(ñ) = random(]max (ϕorder(Parent(ñ)), ϕorder(iops(ñ))),ϕorder(ifol(Parent(ñ)))[),  
                                                           
6 By default, a clone inherits the label of its source counterpart, except if the anonymous value is 
explicitely selected. 
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where iops and ifol denote respectively the immediate original preceding sibling and immediate 
following of a given node, where preceding sibling and following conform to the XPath 
semantics. 
3.3 Authorization on ancestor relationships 
Authorizations on ancestor relationships are required to deal with classification disclosure. The 
objective is to mask the membership of a given descendant node n to a given class represented 
by an ancestor node a, being the root of that class. In this respect, two situations have to be 
carefully distinguished depending on whether the information to be protected is: (1) to which 
class the node n belongs to or (2) the fact that n is actually classified (i.e., member of any class). 
 
In the former case, the information to be hidden is the identification of the class the node n 
belongs to. This information is carried out by the ancestor node a, either by its label, by one of 
its attribute or by one of its sub-element. The problem can be solved by cloning the node a as 
well as the path linking a to n and by masking a’s label if required (note that cloning does not 
consider attributes nor sub-elements). This leads to a first form of relationship authorization 
called Ancestor depersonalization, with the following semantics. 
 
Ancestor depersonalization  
Let a, n ∈ NeSource / a ∈ Anc(n). Depersonalizing this relationship has the following impact on 
View :  
 
- Clone(Path(a,n’)): clone the subpath of Path(a,n) that may be common with any other descendant of a. 
Path(a,n’) ⊆ Path(a,Parent(n)). 
- φlabel(ã) ← “anonymous”: depersonalize the ancestor clone ã if required. 
- Parent(ã) ← Parent(a): attach ã to the hierarchy, as a sibling of the original ancestor a. 
- Parent(n) ← ñ: attach n (along with the potential subtree rooted at n) to the extremity of the cloned path. 
 
In the latter case, the information to be hidden is the presence of a itself in the path leading to n. 
Rule R2 of our motivating example illustrates this situation, where the fact that a medical act be 
classified as a medical trial (i.e., be descendant of Protocol) is the sensitive information. More 
generally, this situation occurs each time a class membership reveals an exception to a general 
situation. The problem can be solved again by cloning the path leading to n while discarding a 
from that path. This leads to a second form of relationship authorization called Path reduction, 
the semantics of which is defined as follows. 
 
Path reduction  
Let a, n ∈ NeSource / a ∈ Anc(n). Discarding this relationship (i.e., suppressing a in the path from 
rView to n) has the following impact on View :  
 
- if  a = Parent(n) then Parent(n) ← Parent(a) :  attach n (and its potential subtree) to its grandfather else
  
- Clone(Path(a’,n’)) : let a’ ∈ NeSource / a’ ∈ Child(a) and a’ ∈ Anc(n) clone the subpath of Path(a, n) 
that may be common with any other descendant of a. Path(a’,n’) ⊆ Path(Child(a),Parent(n)) 
- Parent(ã’) ← Parent(a): attach ã’ to the hierarchy, as a sibling of the original ancestor a 
- Parent(n) ← ñ’ : attach n (along with the potential subtree rooted at n) to the extremity of the cloned 
path. 
3.4 Authorization on sibling relationships 
By masking the membership of a given node to a given class, ancestor depersonalization and 
path reduction hide the correlation between that node and all its initial siblings. There is a need 
however for a more selective sibling decorrelation to cope with situations where a group of 
nodes has to keep its sibling relationships unaffected while being disconnected from its class. 
10  SMIS 
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Rule R3 of our motivating example illustrates this need. In this example, medical acts and 
analysis information on one side and identification information (name, address) on the other side have 
to maintain their respective sibling relationships while being pairwise decorrelated. Sibling 
decorrelation is actually the motivation for hiding the classification of these two groups of nodes in the 
same medical folder. While ancestor relationship authorizations provide a mean to hide a 
correlation of cardinality 1-n (i.e. between a single node and its siblings), hiding a correlation of 
cardinality n-m, (i.e. between two groups of respectively n and m nodes) requires the 
introduction of a third relationship authorization called Selective Sibling Decorrelation. To 
make the approach general, we consider each selective sibling decorrelation as decorrelating 
one group of nodes (denoted by g1) from all its siblings (group of nodes denoted by g2). Thus, 
several groups can be distinguished iteratively. The semantics of a selective sibling 
decorrelation is defined as follows: 
 
Selective sibling decorrelation  
Let g1, g2 ⊂ NeSource / ∀n, n’ ∈ g1∪g2, Parent(n)=Parent(n’)=a. Hiding the sibling relationship 
between g1’s elements and their siblings has the following impact on the document View :  
- Clone(a):  clone the parent of g1’s elements 
- φlabel(ã) ← “anonymous”: depersonalize the parent clone ã, if required. 
- Parent(ã) ← Parent(a): attach ã to the hierarchy, as a sibling of the original parent a. 
- ∀n ∈ g1, Parent(n) ← ã : attach g1’s elements to the parent clone. 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
Ancestor depersonalization, path reduction and selective sibling decorrelation, capture the three 
dimensions of the classification disclosure problem, namely the identification of the class a node 
belongs to, the fact that a node is actually member of a class, the correlations between a node 
and its siblings. An ancestor relationship being determined by exactly two nodes (a and n), the 
authorizations attached to different ancestor relationships rooted at the same node a and related 
to different n’s may be different. Thus, a non-uniform descendant exposure can be achieved, as 
requested by the consent principle. 
 
How relationship authorizations are actually declared, how they interact with node 
authorizations and how conflicts among rules are managed is the topic of the next section. 
4 Relationship-Aware Access Control Model 
4.1 Preliminaries 
An authorized view can be seen as the result of a global selection and restructuration process 
applied to the source document. At first glance, a general-purpose language like XQuery could 
be considered as the appropriate mean to define this process. This solution is actually possible 
since XQuery is a Turing complete language. However, it has been shown that even simple 
XML document restructurations, such as deleting a subtree or an element, can result in rather 
complex XQuery expressions [7]. Such expressions resemble more iterative programs than 
declarative statements. Implementing an access control policy by an XQuery program would 
strongly entail its readability and manageability and its soundness will be difficult to assess.  
 
By contrast, an access control model is expected to exhibit the following properties: (i) 
expressiveness (a robust subset of practical situations must be tackled), (ii) conciseness (a given 
policy must be expressed with as few rules as possible), (iii) soundness (the resulting View  
must translate accurately the semantics of a given policy) and (iv) manageability (a policy must 
be human understandable and its evolution must be easy). 
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To meet these requirements, existing XML access control models express a policy as a set of 
authorization rules, a rule engine being responsible for implementing the conflict resolution 
among rules and for translating Source  into View  according to these rules. Due to its 
simplicity and expressiveness XPath is usually the language elected to identify the target nodes 
of each rule. We will follow in existing models’ footstep to express relationship authorizations. 
In this section, we first introduce a reference model for expressing node authorizations that 
captures the common foundation of existing XML access control models. Then, we propose an 
extension to this reference model that supports relationship authorizations while preserving the 
four properties mentioned above. Thereby, rather than proposing yet-another access control 
model for XML, we show that the proposed approach allows a seamless integration of 
relationship authorizations in existing access control models. 
4.2 Reference model for node authorizations 
While existing XML access control models introduce subtleties on the way node authorizations 
propagate down through the hierarchy and conflicts are solved, they share strong commonalities. 
Basically, an authorization rule takes the form of a tuple <Subject, Object, Operation, Sign>. 
Depending on the models, Subject can take many forms (a user, a group of users, a role, an 
application, an IP address, etc). Object characterizes the part of the XML document targeted by 
the rule. Operation denotes the operation (read, update, delete, append) the Subject may 
perform on the Object. Finally, Sign denotes either a permission (grant rule) or a prohibition 
(deny rule) for that operation. In the sequel, we do not make any assumption on the way subjects 
are managed and, since the focus is on data confidentiality, read is the only operation of interest. 
As a consequence, we consider a simplified form of node authorization rule, allowing us 
concentrating on the fundamental issue addressed in this paper, that is how the objects to be 
controlled are characterized. 
 
Node authorization rule 
A node authorization rule NA is defined by a tuple: <Subject, Objects, Sign> where: 
- Subject is an abstract entity, 
- Objects ⊆ NSource, 
- Sign ∈ {+, -}. 
Objects correspond to attributes and elements of the source document, identified by an XPath 
expression. The expressive power of the access control model, and then the granularity of 
sharing, is directly bounded by the supported subset of the XPath language. For the sake of 
generality, we consider a well recognized subset of XPath denoted by XP
{[],*,//}
[21]. This subset 
consists of node tests, the child axis (/), the descendant axis (//), wildcards (*) and predicates 
([]). 
 
By allowing positive and negative authorizations, Sign provides a simple and effective way to 
specify authorization applicable to sets of objects with support for exception [19]. To match the 
well accepted least privilege principle, we consider a closed policy, meaning that an implicit 
negative authorization applies to the whole document. In other words, the access to every object 
that is not explicitly authorized is forbidden. 
We assume that both positive and negative authorizations propagate implicitly down through the 
XML hierarchy. This mode of propagation corresponds to the cascading option present in well-
known models [4,9,15,23]. Conflicts between direct and/or propagated rules are managed as 
follows. Let us assume two rules R1 and R2 of opposite sign. These rules may conflict because 
they are defined either on the same node, or on two different nodes n1 and n2, linked by an 
ancestor relationship (i.e., n1∈Anc(n2)). In the former situation, the Denial-Takes-Precedence 
policy favors the negative rule according to the least privilege principle. In the latter situation, 
the Most-Specific-Object-Takes-Precedence policy favors the rule that applies directly to a node 
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against the inherited one (i.e., R2 takes precedence over R1 on n2). In other words, 
authorizations propagate until overridden by an opposite authorization on a descendant node. 
4.3 Relationship authorization rules 
The challenge is to complement this reference model with relationship authorizations, thereby 
increasing the expressiveness of the model, without hurting conciseness, soundness and 
manageability. To this end, we propose a unified statement allowing declaring the three classes 
of relationship authorizations introduced in Section3. 
 
Relationship authorization rule 
A relationship authorization rule RA is defined by a tuple <Subject, Objects>, where Objects is 
in turn defined by a 4-tuples: <Anc, Desc, Path-visibility, Sibling> 
- Anc and Desc characterize the relationship(s) to be protected among a (set of) descendant(s) and one of 
its (their) ancestor. Anc and Desc are the common denominator of the three classes of relationship 
authorizations. They are both defined as XP{[],*,//} path expressions. 
- Path-visibility characterizes the vision of the path u linking each descendant node to its ancestor. For 
each node n participating in u, Path-visibility states whether the node is preserved or not in the path 
clone ũ and, in the positive case, whether n’s label is preserved or not in ñ. Path-visibility is the mean 
by which ancestor depersonalization and path reduction can be expressed. 
- Implicitly, hiding an ancestor relationship hides the relationship between a descendant node and its 
siblings. To allow for a selective sibling decorrelation, Sibling characterizes the list of siblings a 
descendant must keep its relationships with. 
The RA definition deserves two important remarks. First, regarding conciseness and 
manageability, RA captures gracefully and in a rather simple way ancestor depersonalization, 
path reduction and selective sibling decorrelation. By defining Anc and Desc as XPath 
expressions, it allows to sump up Desc ancestor relationships in a single statement. Second, 
unlike NA, RA does not integrate a Sign parameter. The reason for this is that RA characterizes 
only negative authorizations. The general semantics of the model is as follows. NA rules are 
defined according to a closed policy and deliver an authorized view View ’ ⊆ Source  in the 
usual way (i.e., edges having one of their extremity node discarded by a NA rule are in turn 
discarded from View ’). RA rules are defined on View ’ according to an open policy and deliver 
the final authorized view View . Consequently, if no RA rule is defined, the semantics of the 
model complies with the one of the existing XML access control models, meaning that a 
seamless integration of relationship authorizations in these models can be reached. 
 
Ancestors and Descendants 
For a RA rule to be consistent, condition Desc⊆Anc must be enforced, where ⊆ denotes the 
containment relation between XPath expressions. Unfortunately, the containment problem has 
been shown co-NP complete for the class of XP
{[],//,*}
 expressions [21]. To avoid consistency 
checking, Desc is defined as a relative expression with respect to Anc. Thus, Anc determines a 
set of path origins while Anc/Desc determines a set of path extremities. 
 
Path visibility and Sibling 
 
Table  1 (resp.Table  2) summarizes the possible choices for the Path visibility (resp. Sibling) 
parameter along with their associated semantics. The first row of each table gives an extensive 
syntax for the corresponding parameter while the next rows propose shortcuts to express a 
monotonic policy along the path. Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the effects of these parameters. 
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Table  1. Path-visibility semantics 
Path-visibility Semantics of Path visibility 
[label1?,.,labeln?] gives the list of nodes to be discarded (?=†) 
or depersonalized (?=Φ). 
[] all nodes are kept on the path (i.e., all 
nodes are cloned) and their original label is 
inherited. This option is the default one. 
 [Φ] all nodes are kept on the path and are 
depersonalized (i.e., the label of their 
respective clone is set to ”anonymous”). 
[†] All nodes are discarded from the path. 
 
Table  2. Sibling semantics 
Sibling Semantics of Sibling 
[label1,… 
labeln] 
Nodes those label belongs to this 
list must keep their sibling relationship 
with the descendant node of interest. 
[⊥] The descendant node is 
disconnected  from all its siblings. This is 
the default option. 
[ψ] The descendant node preserves its 
sibling relationships with all siblings 
targeted by the same authorization rule as 
him. 
[≡] The descendant node preserves all 
the sibling relationships it is involved in. 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the use of a relationship-aware access control model for expressing the 
access control rules introduced in our motivating example. These rules are actually access 
control policies since they mix NA and RA rules. Some of these rules reference the user’s 
consent. We do the assumption that the user’s consent is materialized by a Consent element 
present in each folder, in turn composed of subelements (e.g., directory, marketing) expressing 
the dimensions of this consent. For expressing R1, three NA rules are required to capture the 
information that is strictly mandatory for the hospital’s directory (typically, MedActs and 
Analysis are withdrawn). 
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Figure 4. Selective sibling decorrelation examples 
Rule RA1 depersonalizes ([Φ]) the Service ancestor (/* targets all services) of each descendant 
folder the patient of which didn’t consent disclosing that information (predicate on 
Folder/Consent) and disconnects that folder from its siblings ([⊥]). For R2, RA2 alone 
expresses a path reduction discarding the parent Protocol ([†]) of Act elements. For expressing 
R3, two NA rules deny to the medical lab access to the name and address of patients who didn’t 
consent disclosing this information for marketing purpose. For patients giving their consent, 
RA3 precludes the inference between the identification information (Name, Address) and the 
rest of the folder. 
Rule R1 : 
NA1: < DirectoryGroup , /Hospital, + > 
NA2: < DirectoryGroup, //MedActs, - > 
NA3: < DirectoryGroup, //Analysis, - > 
RA1: < DirectoryGroup, /*, /Folder[./Consent/Directory  
 /Service=  'no visible'], [Φ], [⊥] > 
Rule R2 :   
RA2: < Pharmacist, //MedActs/Protocol, /Act, [†],[⊥]> 
Rule R3 :  
NA5: < Medical lab, //Folder[./Consent/Marketing/  
 PersonalInfo='no visible']/name, - > 
NA6:< Medical lab, //Folder[./Consent/Marketing/  
 PersonalInfo ='no visible ']/Address, - > 
RA3: < Medical lab, //Folder, /Name, [],  [Address]> 
Figure 5. Motivating example's NA & RA rules 
4.4 Conflict resolution 
Three classes of conflicts have to be tackled in a relationship-aware model: conflicts among NA 
rules, conflict between NA and RA rules and conflicts among RA rules. The resolution of 
conflicts among NA rules is directly inherited from existing XML access control models and is 
detailed in Section 4.2. Conflicts between NA and RA rules are avoided by construction since 
RA rules are defined on the view produced by the evaluation of NA rules, according to an open 
policy. In other words, NA rules always take precedence on RA rules. This section is thus 
devoted to the management of the third class of conflicts, namely conflicts among RA rules. 
 
Again, three classes of conflicts among RA rules have to be distinguished: conflicts on Desc 
(different rules targeting the same descendant node), on Path-visibility (different rules targeting 
the same ancestor-descendant relationship with different Path-visibility options) and on Sibling 
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(different rules targeting the same ancestor-descendant relationship with different Sibling 
decorrelations). 
 
Conflicts on Desc 
Conflicts on Desc arise when two rules RA1 and RA2 are such that RA1.Anc⊆RA2.Anc and 
RA1.Desc= RA2.Desc, where ⊆ denotes the inclusion of XPath expressions7. 
 
Independently of the value of the Path-visibility and Sibling parameters, rule RA1 states that a 
new path has to be created from any pair of nodes (Parent(n1),n2) such that n1∈RA1.Anc and 
n2∈ RA1.Desc, thereby hiding the ancestor relationship between n1 and n2. Similarly, rule RA2 
states that a new path has to be created from any pair of nodes (Parent(n3),n2) such that 
n3∈RA2.Anc and n2∈ RA2.Desc. Since RA1.Anc⊆RA2.Anc, Parent(n3)∈ Anc(Parent(n1)). 
Thus, hiding the ancestor relationship between n3 and n2 in turn hides the one between n1 and 
n3, due to the transitivity of the ancestor relationship. In other words, RA1 is subsumed by RA2. 
Conflicts on Path-Visibility 
Path-visibility conflicts arise when two different rules, targeting the same ancestor-descendant 
relationship (i.e., RA1.Anc=RA2.Anc and RA1.Desc=RA2.Desc), exhibit two different Path-
visibility. Table  3 summarizes all possible combinations of Path-visibility for these two rules 
and their associated conflict resolution. The proposed conflict resolution being commutative, 
operand1 and operand2 represent either the Path-visibility of RA1 or RA2. While solving 
conflicts, the decision is always taken based on the least privilege principle.  
 
If one rule does not impose any restriction on the path, the Path-visibility of the second rule 
always takes precedence (row 1). If one rule discards all nodes from the path, its Path-visibility 
always takes precedence (row 2). Row 3 is self-explanatory. If one rule depersonalizes all nodes 
on the path while the other rule selects a list of labels, this list of labels has to be expanded with 
missing depersonalized labels (row 4). Finally, if each rule selects a list of labels, the union of 
the two lists has to be computed (row 5). If the same label is present on both lists, labeli† takes 
precedence over labeliΦ. 
Table  3. Path-visibility conflict resolution 
Operand1 Operand2 Conflict Resolution 
[ ] ∀ Operand2 
 [†] ∀ [†] 
[Φ] [Φ] [Φ] 
[Φ] [label1?,…, 
labeln?] 
∀ node ∈ Path(anc,desc) 
if φlabel (node) ∉ 
[label1?,..,labeln?] then  
[label1?,.,labeln?] U [φlabel 
(node)Φ] 
[label1?,..., 
labeln?] 
[label'1?,…, 
label'n?] 
L = [label1?,…,labeln?] U 
[label'1?,…,label'n?] 
∀labeli∈ L, labeli†∈ L and  
labeli
 Φ ∈ L ⇒ L – [labeli Φ] 
 
Conflicts on Sibling 
                                                           
7 As stated in Section 4.3, the containment problem has been shown co-NP complete for the class of 
XP{[],//,*} expressions we are considering [21]. While a static evaluation of the containment property is thus 
precluded, its dynamic evaluation is rather straighforward. Static simplifications of the rule system could 
be envisioned anyway by considering a smaller (though powerful) subset of XPath [21]. This point is 
clearly outside the scope of this paper. 
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Sibling conflicts arise when two different rules, targeting the same ancestor-descendant 
relationship, exhibit two different Sibling decorrelations. Table  4 summarizes all possible 
combinations of Sibling for these two rules and their associated conflict resolution. Again, the 
proposed conflict resolution being commutative, operand1 and operand2 represent either the 
Sibling parameter of RA1 or RA2 and the conflict resolution is done in accordance with the least 
privilege principle. 
 
Row 1 states that [⊥] takes always precedence over [ψ], [label1,…,labeln] and [≡], since it is the 
most restrictive policy (the descendant is disconnected from all its siblings). In the same way, 
[ψ] and [label1,…,labeln] takes always precedence over [≡], since [≡] is the less restrictive 
policy (row 2). Conflicts between [ψ] and [label1,…,labeln] (row 3) and between two lists of 
labels (row 4) can be treated uniformly, considering that [ψ] is nothing but the singleton [φlabel 
(desc)]. Solving the conflict sums up to compute the intersection between both lists of labels. If 
this intersection turns to be empty, [⊥] becomes the final decision. 
Table  4. Sibling conflict resolution 
Operand1 Operand2 Conflict Resolution 
[⊥] ∀ [⊥]  
[≡] ∀ Operand2 
 [ψ] [label1, … 
labeln] 
[ψ] if φlabel (desc) ∈[label1, … 
labeln],  
[⊥] otherwise 
[label1, … 
labeln] 
[label'1, … 
label'n] 
  [label1, … labeln] ∩ [label'1, 
… label'n] = Α,  
[⊥] if A= ∅  
 
Note that sibling conflicts may happen indirectly if a same node is selected to participate in 
different groups of siblings (e.g., RA1:<-,/B,-,[A]> and RA2:<-,/C,-,[A]>). The intuition may 
lead to duplicate A elements in order to integrate them at the same time in B’s and C’s siblings. 
However, the presence of the same A element(s) in both sets may allow some inference 
regarding the relationship between B and C elements. For this reason, the conflict is solved by 
enforcing [⊥] as the Sibling parameter of the conflicting rules. 
5 Implementation issues  
An important question is whether tractable algorithms can be devised to implement relationship-
aware access control models. To this end, we study how existing algorithms supporting node 
authorizations can be extended to cope with relationship authorizations.  Two classes of 
algorithms are considered depending on whether the access control policy applies on a 
materialized document [2,9,15] or on a streaming document [6]. We give preliminary 
performance measurements for the first class of algorithms, which is the most popular one and 
for which one public domain algorithm can serve as reference [10]. The objective is to assess 
whether the relative cost incurred by the management of relationship authorizations remains 
acceptable. A more comprehensive performance analysis including algorithmic optimizations is 
part of our future work but is outside the scope of this paper. 
 
Let us first consider the algorithm implemented by Damiani et al and put in the public domain 
[10]. This algorithm evaluates an access control policy composed by node authorizations and 
implements the foundation of the abstract model introduced in Section 4.2. Roughly speaking, 
this algorithm works as follows. First, the building phase of the algorithm parses the Source  
document and builds a DOM representation thanks to the Apache's Xalan tool. Main memory 
data structures are allocated at this stage to annotate later on the document nodes with 
authorization rules. Second, the tree labeling phase evaluates the NA rules related to a given 
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subject. Each time a node is targeted by the XPath expression associated to a NA rule, the node 
is annotated with the rule. Third, the conflict resolution phase resolves potential conflicts among 
rules targeting the same node and propagates the final decision about the outcome of each node 
to its subtree. Finally, the pruning phase discards every node annotated negatively. Augmenting 
this algorithm with the management of RA rules is rather straightforward. The building phase 
remains unchanged. The tree labeling phase evaluates RA rules in parallel with NA rules and 
each descendant node targeted by the XPath expression (i.e., Anc/Desc) associated to a RA rule 
is annotated with the rule. The conflict resolution phase is extended with the management of 
potential conflicts among RA rules targeting the same node, according to the policy discussed in 
Section 4.4. No propagation is required by RA rules. The pruning phase remains unchanged. A 
final reconstruction phase is however mandatory to perform the cloning and shuffling 
operations. 
 
The extension described above has been implemented in Java, making Damiani’s algorithm 
relationship-aware at a minimal software development cost. Preliminary performance 
measurements have been conducted on this prototype on a PC equipped with a 3Ghz CPU and 
1GB of RAM. Damiani’s algorithm, as well as our extension, makes sense only if the DOM 
representation of the Source  document fits in memory. Considering the high expansion factor 
between a Source  document and its DOM representation (extended with annotation 
structures), we used synthetic datasets with a large population of small nodes, the node 
cardinality being the decisive factor in our context. We used ToXgene [33] to generate a 
collection of documents ranging from 10 K nodes to 150 K nodes and sharing the structure of 
the medical motivating example depicted in Figure 1. We conducted a first set of experiments 
varying the number of rules participating in an access control policy, the mix of NA and RA 
rules, the complexity of these rules (absolute vs. relative XPath expressions, predicates, number 
of targeted nodes) and the number of conflicts among rules. The meaning of these rules was not 
a concern at this stage. The impact of relationship authorizations on the performance of each 
algorithm’s phase, as observed in these experiments, deserves the following remarks.  
The building and pruning phases are common to the initial algorithm and its extension. Not 
surprisingly, the performance of these two phases evolved linearly with the document size and 
can thus be expressed in terms of ratios (building = 4.4ms/Knode, pruning = 0.4ms/Knode).  
 
The cost of the labeling phase appeared to be more related to the number of rules participating 
in the access control policy than to their own complexity. This cost turned out to be the 
dominant factor with policies involving more than 8 rules. 
 
Different results could probably be obtained with different XPath engines but these variations 
would impact NA and RA rules exactly the same way, making this issue irrelevant for this study.  
The conflict resolution phase is strongly dominated by the traversal of the DOM tree and the 
associated data structure containing annotations, making its cost again linear (1,07ms/Knode). 
Consequently, while conflicts among RA rules are semantically more complex to solve than 
conflicts among NA rules, the difference in terms of performance turned out to be non 
significant, increasing the total conflict resolution cost by less than 5%.  
Finally, the reconstruction phase depends on the document size after pruning and on the number 
of nodes (i.e. Desc) that are targeted by RA rules and that need to be cloned. For example, the 
cost of depersonalizing the Service ancestor of all Prescriptions (3640 elements) in a 150Knode 
document amounts to 840ms. Note that this rule has no other interest than generating a high 
number of clones (14560). There is no significant difference on the reconstruction cost between 
ancestor depersonalization, path reduction and sibling decorrelation. 
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Figure 6. Impact of RA on the motivating example. 
Figure 6 delivers a different view of the measurements. It pictures the total cost of each 
algorithm’s phase and the extra cost incurred by relationship authorizations to implement the 
access control policies of our motivating example. Rules R1, R2 and R3, being actually a mix of 
NA and RA rules (see Figure 5) are evaluated on documents ranging from 50Knode to 
150Knode. To facilitate the readability of the figure, a cursor (on the right side of each 
histogram) separates the cost incurred by the evaluation of NA rules (below the cursor) from the 
extra cost incurred by RA rules (above the cursor). The NA total cost corresponds to (building + 
NA labeling + NA conflict + pruning) while the RA extra cost corresponds to (RA labeling + 
RA conflict + reconstruction). The figure is almost self-explanatory. The total cost is here 
dominated by the building phase, the most complex policy containing 5 rules. Regarding the 
reconstruction phase, Rule R2 incurs the highest cost. The cloning cost explains this behavior. 
Indeed, R1 and R3 target the same number of Desc nodes (respectively 120, 240 and 360 for a 
50Knode, 100Knode and 150Knode document) since there is a single Name element in each 
folder. Rule R2 targets three times more elements since each Protocol (one per folder) owns in 
the average three Act children. The shuffling cost itself is insignificant, shuffling being nothing 
but a random function call. As a final remark, the relationship authorizations come in this 
example at a rather low cost (roughly 10% of the total cost). 
However, these preliminary conclusions have to be put in perspective with the fact that all 
measurements have been performed in memory. To evaluate access control policy on huge 
documents, a streaming strategy must be investigated. An algorithm based on non-deterministic 
finite automata (NFA) has been recently proposed to tackle this issue [6]. This algorithm 
implements a traditional access control model, similar to the abstract model introduced in 
Section 4.2.  
In this approach, NA rules are translated into NFA and a global authorization rules evaluator 
determines the authorization outcome for a current node according to the current state of all 
NFA. Extending the approach with relationship authorizations seems natural since the Anc and 
Desc XPath expressions of each RA rule can be translated in NFA, in the same way as NA rules. 
Once the outcome of a node is determined, the stack materializing the current states of each 
NFA contains enough information to deliver the path from the root to the current node. This 
information is sufficient to implement ancestor depersonalization, path reduction and sibling 
decorrelation. However, the reconstruction phase relies on shuffling, a mechanism hurting data 
streaming. Indeed, the nodes to be shuffled have to be buffered until the subtree rooted at their 
common ancestor has been totally explored. Note however that buffering is required even in the 
case of node authorizations to manage pending predicates (i.e. a predicate P conditioning the 
delivery of a subtree S but encountered after S while parsing the document). This issue has been 
tackled in [6] and similar techniques seem to be applicable in our context. Making streaming 
access control algorithms relationship-aware is part of our future work. 
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6 Related Work 
As stated in the introduction, the problem of regulating access to XML documents has attracted 
a considerable attention from the database community in recent years.  
 
Most discretionary access control (DAC) models for XML [3,4,9,15] share the same foundation 
while proposing different interpretations or options to define subjects, to propagate rules down 
through the hierarchy and to solve conflicts among rules. [23] introduces static analysis rather 
than run-time checks for this class of models. [20] proposes a provisional access control model 
that allows for more sophisticated controls (e.g., an access can be granted provided it is 
recorded in a audit trail). All these models focus on node authorizations and then fail in 
answering the requirements introduced in our motivating example. In addition, and as mentioned 
in the introduction, expressing an exception to a negative rule may lead to tricky situations that 
are difficult to manage accurately without relationship authorization. While this situation is even 
not mentioned in most proposals, some models preclude it [3,15,23] while some others disclose 
the label of forbidden ancestors [9,20] or disclose at least the presence of these ancestors by 
replacing their label by a dummy value [12]. The former solution restrains the expressiveness of 
the model while the latter violates in some ways the least privilege principle. In addition to 
dummy labels, [12] provides a new answer to this problem by transforming the view of a given 
path thanks to an XPath expression (executed at traversal time), under the assumption that the 
resulting view remains compliant with the DTD provided to the subject.  
Role-based access control (RBAC) models for XML [18,35] suffer from the same limitation wrt 
access control on XML relationships. [26] allows for relationships among XML documents, 
considering each XML document as an entity playing a certain role, semantically linked with 
other entities. The problem is clearly different from the one addressed in our paper. Finally, 
mandatory access control (MAC) models for XML deserve an interesting remark regarding the 
management of XML relationships. MAC models are generally monotonic, meaning that 
sensitivity level (classification in the MAC vocable) assigned to objects increase along the 
hierarchy (i.e., descendants have a higher sensitivity level than their respective ancestor). 
Therefore, the situation where a given subject is granted access to a descendant of a prohibited 
node can simply not be expressed. [8] introduces a non-monotonic MAC model that 
circumvents this limitation. However, the focus of this work is on optimizing the secure 
evaluation of XPath twig queries. Query rewriting techniques are used to append additional 
security check predicates on sensitivity levels to the original twig query. Therefore, the model 
can grant access to a descendant of a forbidden node but no visibility can be given of the path 
from the document root to this node. 
 
As a conclusion, no work we are aware of consider XML relationship authorizations as part of 
the access control and then all fail in answering the requirements introduced in our motivating 
example. In addition, due to the lack of explicit ancestor relationship authorizations, granting 
access to a descendant of a prohibited node is either impossible or source of important 
difficulties in many models. 
7 Conclusion  
Several access control models have been proposed so far for regulating access to XML 
documents. By focusing on node authorizations and disregarding relationship authorizations, 
existing XML access control models fail in answering the classification disclosure and uniform 
descendant exposure problems. The consequence of this deficiency is the violation of the need-
to-know and consent principles (two basic principles of laws related to the safeguard of personal 
information) in a number of situations. 
To tackle this important issue, we advocate the integration of ancestor and sibling relationships 
as first class citizen in the access control models for XML. To the best of our knowledge, this 
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paper is the first study addressing this issue. More precisely, this paper makes the following 
contributions. First, it characterizes three classes of relationship authorizations (ancestor 
depersonalization, path reduction and selective sibling decorrelation) capturing the dimensions 
of the classification disclosure and uniform descendant exposure problems. Two mechanisms 
(cloning and shuffling) are introduced to translate accurately (i.e., by a way precluding 
inference) these authorizations into an authorized view of a source document. Second, it 
proposes a rule-based formulation for these classes of relationship authorizations allowing their 
seamless integration in existing XML access control models, making them relationship-aware. 
Third, it shows that tractable algorithms can be devised to support relationship authorizations 
and provides preliminary performance measurements. 
The next step in our research agenda is to study streaming algorithms supporting relationship 
authorizations. Streaming access control is actually a major issue with respect to performance 
(management of large documents) and support of new forms of data delivery (selective data 
dissemination). 
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